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Corporate governance is an important research area in corporate 
finance, and an important practical problem in China’s economy 
development. It’s proved, based on the assumption of rationality, 
traditional corporate governance mechanism is not as effective as people 
expected. This research attempts to break the limitations of rationality 
assumption in traditional corporate governance theory, base on the 
assumption of "corporate governance participants are irrational ", explore 
the influence on corporate governance validity from participants’ 
irrational behavior, and put forward a new explanation for the 
contradiction between constantly improved governance mechanism and 
corporate governance scandal. 
The study shows that, in the current corporate governance 
mechanism, managers, the board of directors and shareholders' irrational 
behavior can decline the corporate management effectiveness, and the 
perfection of external governance mechanism can correct it. (1) studies on 
managers show that: (a) in the poor performance company, overconfident 
managers could avoid being removed in some extent. (b) executive 
compensation, whatever the level of salary or salary gap,in an important 
influence factor for the managers’ self-confidence degree. (c) the 
members’ characteristics  in the board of directors, such as age 
heterogeneity, terms heterogeneity and career experience heterogeneity, 
are important influence factors for the managers’ self-confidence degree. 
(2) studies on the board of directors show that the social level height of 
directors have positive correlation with board’s overconfidence, 
especially, the chairman of the board play an outstanding role in total 
samples, but in non-state-owned listed companies, the members of the 
board of directors play a more significant role. (3) studies on stockholders 
show that stockholders’ optimistic forcast for the corporate performance 
has a significant negative influence on corporate governance validity. 
The innovation and significance include: the first, behavioral theory 
be applied to explain corporate governance validity, instead of rational 
assumption and utility maximization, expland the behavioral research in 
the application research of corporate finance; the second, in China’s listed 














corporate governance participation, how to measure management 
effectiveness, and what are the influencing factors of the irrational 
behavior, these make an important theoretical and practical significance. 
Person's psychology is difficult to be observed, this study suggests 
that basing on behavioral theory, considering the participants’ irrational 
factors, the new solutions for the contradiction between corporate 
governance scandal and constantly improving corporate governance 
mechanism will be found. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance; Behavorial research; Property right; 

















目  录 
1. 绪  论 ......................................................................................................................................... 9 
1.1 研究背景与问题的提出 ............................................................................................... 9 
1.2 本文结构安排及研究方法 ......................................................................................... 11 
1.2.1 研究思路及研究方法 ......................................................................................... 11 
1.2.2 本文的结构安排与主要内容 ............................................................................. 12 
1.3 论文的创新之处 ......................................................................................................... 13 
1.4 小结 ............................................................................................................................. 14 
2 理论基础与文献回顾 ................................................................................................................. 15 
2.1 第一代公司治理：Berle-Means 范式 ...................................................................... 15 
2.2 第二代公司治理：LLSV 范式 .................................................................................... 19 
2.2.1 Berle-Means 命题面临的挑战 .......................................................................... 19 
2.2.2 法与金融学的兴起 ............................................................................................. 22 
2.3 第三代公司治理：行为公司治理 ............................................................................. 25 
2.3.1 前两代公司治理研究存在的问题 ..................................................................... 25 
2.3.2 行为研究的兴起 ................................................................................................. 27 
2.3.3 行为公司治理 ..................................................................................................... 32 
2.4 小结 ............................................................................................................................. 34 3．管理者非理性行为的实证研究 ............................................................................................... 35 
3．1 管理者信心与公司治理的有效性 ........................................................................... 35 
3．1．1 理论分析与研究假说 ..................................................................................... 35 
3．1．2 实证研究设计 ................................................................................................. 38 
3．1．3 实证检验结果 ................................................................................................. 42 
3．2 管理者政治联系与过度自信 ................................................................................... 47 
3．2．1 理论分析与研究假说 ..................................................................................... 48 
3．2．2 实证研究设计 ................................................................................................. 49 
3．2．3 实证结果与分析 ............................................................................................. 52 
3．3 薪酬激励与管理者过度自信：基于薪酬行为观的研究 ........................................ 62 
3．3．1 文献回顾 ......................................................................................................... 63 
3．3．2 制度背景 ......................................................................................................... 64 














3．3．4 实证研究设计 ................................................................................................. 66 
3．3．5 实证检验结果 .................................................................................................. 68 
3．4 小结 ........................................................................................................................... 73 4．董事会非理性行为的实证研究 ............................................................................................... 75 
4．1  董事会成员特征与管理者过度自信 ..................................................................... 75 
4．1．1 理论分析与研究假说 ..................................................................................... 76 
4．1．2 实证研究设计 ................................................................................................. 78 
4．1．3 实证结果与分析 ............................................................................................. 82 
4．2 社会层级与董事会的非理性行为 ........................................................................... 90 
4．2．1 制度背景与理论分析 ..................................................................................... 91 
4．2．2 实证研究设计 ................................................................................................. 94 
4．2．3 实证结果与分析 ............................................................................................. 97 
4．3 小结 ......................................................................................................................... 103 
5．大股东非理性行为的实证研究 ............................................................................................. 104 
5．1 制度背景与理论分析 ............................................................................................. 104 
5．1．1 制度背景 ....................................................................................................... 104 
5．1．2 理论分析与研究假说 ................................................................................... 106 
5．2 实证研究设计 ......................................................................................................... 108 
5．2．1 样本选择 ....................................................................................................... 108 
5．2．2 研究变量的定义 ........................................................................................... 108 
5．2．3 描述性统计 ................................................................................................... 109 
5．3 实证结果与分析 ..................................................................................................... 110 
5．3．1 大股东过度自信对公司治理有效性的影响 ............................................... 110 
5．3．2 进一步研究 ................................................................................................... 113 
5．4 小结 ......................................................................................................................... 114 
6. 研究结论与启示 ..................................................................................................................... 116 
6.1 研究结论 ................................................................................................................... 116 
6.2 研究启示 ................................................................................................................... 117 
参考文献 ....................................................................................................................................... 118 
致  谢 ........................................................................................................................................... 124 
博士期间发表的主要论文、专著及科研课题 ........................................................................... 125 
博士后期间发表的主要论文、专著及科研课题 ....................................................................... 126 






















公司治理效率的提升探明方向（Jensen & Meckling,1976;Myers,1984; Oliver 
















                                                             
①Ludwig von Mises ,1949,Human Action：a treatise on economics，夏道平译，台湾：远流出版











































                                                             
①实际上，Morck（2007）提出的是“公司治理中的行为财务”，而没有明确地提到行为公司















 1.2.1 研究思路及研究方法 
本文的研究思路如图1所示： 
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检索范围包括与本文相关的重要财务学期刊如Journal of Finance和Journal of 
Financial Economics 等，以及重要心理学期刊 Journal of Personality and 




































































































































现代公司治理理论是财务学的重要组成部分。自 1932 年 Berle-Means 命题






2.1 第一代公司治理：Berle-Means 范式 
1932年，法学家Berle和 Means在其著作《现代公司与私有财产》（The Modern 





Friedland(1953)诠释为 Berle-Means 命题。所谓 Berle-Means 命题实际上包含
了两项结论:所有权的分散和控制权的分离。 
Berle 和 Means 的结论一表明，在 Berle 和 Means 的年代里，美国大公众公
司所有权高度分散。根据 Berle 和 Means 的统计，20 世纪 30 年代初，在美国



















东持有还不到公司 1%的股份。因此，Berle 和 Means 认为，大公众公司的股东如
此之多，以至于没有哪一个股东或者哪一部分股东拥有显著比例的公司股份。
Berle 和 Means 的结论二表明，美国大公众公司所有权与控制权分离程度相当严
重。在 Berle 和 Means 的调查中，44%的大公众公司和 58%的公司财富掌握在公




财产的全部处置权交给那些控制 公司的人。”Berle 和 Means 警告说，管理者控
制将会形成管理者主义，从而将经济引向权力集中的危险方向。 







（Hart,1995) 因此产生代理成本问题（Jensen & Meckling，1976) ，为了解决
代理成本问题,就必须建立完善的公司治理机制，包括从内部由董事会和大股东
对管理者进行监督和激励，从外部激活包括收购、兼并和代理表决权竞争在内的
公司控制权市场（Jensen & Brubacher,1983）。这一理论思维往前继承了 Veblen
（1904 ) 的思想，往后以代理理论为主要内容，中间形成以 Berle-Means 命题
为核心的管理者主义，它为现代公司治理理论奠定了思维原点，并深刻地影响了
几代经济学家对现代公司治理问题的看法（沈艺峰，2005）。 
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